2008 Has Eerie Echos of 1929: Some Relevant Quotes

posted by Curt, on March 21, 2008 05:47 pm

I've mentioned before that I am reading a book titled Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation. I've even quoted from it in some of my other posts. This week I've been reading the chapter on the speculation leading up to the stock market crash in 1929 (and subsequent depression). Some of what I read was startling in the way it tracked almost exactly what we are seeing today. I'm not the only person who has noticed the parallels. People are writing about it all the time, wondering if we're headed for another Great Depression. Some say that we are, others say that the financial protective structures we've set up during the last 80 years make it almost impossible--in their minds the Great Deperssion was close to a once in history event that involved the coincidence of so many unusual factors that it will never be repeated. They may be right . . . I'm not sure. But what is remarkable is the extent that the last few years parallel the 1920s. Here's some history. Judge for yourself.

The first premise of the "new economics," as it was otherwise called, was that the busines cycle--the periodic undulations of trade first observed in Sir William Petty's successions of "dearth and plenty" back in the seventeenth century--had been effectively abolished by the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Before this date, financial crises in the United States had been exacerbated by the absence of a central bank to provide funds to the banking sector durinf periods of instability. The Federal Reserve, with its ability to control itnerest rates and conduct "open market operations"--buying and selling government bonds in order to affect the supply of money available to banks--was hailed in the 1920s as "the remedyto the whole problems of booms, slumps, and panics." As a result, bankers and speculators alike were lulled into a false security which led them to operate irresponsibly, exacerbating the severity of the ensuing crisis (page 192).

Another:

Radios, fridges, cars, and clothes could all be purchased on credit. By the end of the decade, when outstanding installment debt had risen to $6 billion, it was estimated that around an eighth of all retail sales were made on credit. There was a decidedly speculative element in the growth of installment credit: present consumption was being financed with anticipated earnings. Put another way, in their appetite for immediate gratification, the consumers of the 1920s were devouring their future. When the future eventually arrived, they found the cupboard bare. At the time, however, installment purchases were seen as yet another beneficial new era development. Credit and consumption, it was argued, formed a virtuous circle since from the immediate increase in prosperity would come the ability to pay off debt. (page 198)

Some more:

The Federal Reserve in Washington--the institution that had supposedly abolished panics--had inadvertently ignited the stock market boom by lowering interest rates in 1925. This policy was intended to accommodate the Bank of England, which was suffering from an outflow of gold after a disastrous return to the gold standard at the prewar exchange rate. In the summer of 1927, the Fed bowed once more to British demands (backed by the French and Germans) and lowered the discount rate to a record low of 3 1/2 percent. Faced with the growth of speculation, the Fed changed tack and from February 1928 successively raised the discount rate until it reached 6 percent in August 1929. Yet the profits from buying shares on margin were simply too enticing. As long as the market continued rising, speculators were prepared to pay more for their margin loans. While interest rates remained too low to restrain speculation, they became too high for the economy as a whole (or what in the nineteenth century used to be called "legitimate commerce").

This sounds familiar to those of us who watched the market this last week:

In the face of minor stock market panics--in June and December 1928 and later in March 1929--the bull forces succeeded in regrouping. They came out stronger for their trials, until the point was reached when speculators became deaf to warnings they did not wish to hear and developed a belief in their own invincibility. Instead of reasoning, they thrived on countless rumors of fabulous wealth gained in the stock market by valets, chauffeurs, cattlemen, actresses, farmers' wives, and so on. In Only Yesterday, Frederick Lewis Allen described the trance into which the average American had fallen by the summer of 1929:

He visioned an America set free from poverty and toil. He saw a magical order built on the new science and the new prosperity: roads swarming with millions upon millions of automobiles, airplanes darkening the skies, lines of high-tension wire carrying from hilltop to hilltop the power to give life to a thousand labor-saving machines, skyscrapers thrusting above one-time villages, vast cities rising in great geometrical masses of stone and concrete and roaring with perfectly mechanized traffic--and smartly dressed men and women spending, spending with the money they had won by being far-sighted enough to foresee, way back in 1929, what was going to happen. (page 213)

And, finally, a long but good one:

Although stocks continued to slide until the middle of November, Hoover's administration acted promptly to mitigate the fallout from the Crash. The President's public pronouncements were consistently upbeat. He convened business leaders and urged them to maintain wages in order to sustain demand; private and public organizations were asked to bring forward their construction plans; and Treasury Secretary Mellon announced a small tax cut in November. The banking authorities also acted speedily. On 31 October, the Federal Reserve reduced the discount rate to 5 percent (followed by a further reduction of half a percent two weeks later). The New York Federal Reserve Bank oversaw a massive shift in the call loan market, as outstanding margin loans dropped by 50 percent between September and November. Foreign and corporate lenders continued to withdraw their funds from the call loan market, and were replaced by the New York banks which maintained low rates on loans and reduced margin requirements to 25 percent. There were no significant banking or brokerage failures in the immediate aftermath of the Crash, apart from the Industrial Bank of Flint, Michigan, which was forced to close its doors after it was discovered that a cabal of employees had stolen $3.5 million and lost it in the stock market. American corporations also did their best to steady nerves. The day after Black Tuesday, U.S. Steel and several other companies announced increased dividends. Samuel Rosenwald of Sears, Roebuck and Samuel Insull declared they would guarantee their employees' margin accounts. When General Motors announced an extra dividend on 14 November, the news was greeted jubilantly and the Dow Jones stepped off its low of 198 and rose by nearly 25 percent over the next few days.

Optimism was quick to resurface. On the day the market turned, Bernard Baruch cabled Churchill to inform him that the financial crisis was over; although this was of little comfort to the future prime minister, who lost more than L10,000--roughly L300,000 at today's values--in the Crash and was obliged to live frugally for the next few years. Baruch's was a conventional opinion shared by many of the smaller market players who believed the Crash presented them with yet another buying opportunity. The news was mostly positive. Turnover in the stock market was lively at five to six million shares a day; many corporations announced record profits for the previous year; and mergers in banking and utilities continued, as did the property boom. People took comfort in the fact that the major banks appeared well-capitalized. In New York, J.J. Raskob continued with his plans for the hundred-story Empire State Building, which he described as a symbol for "a land which reached for the sky with its feet on the ground." In his ambition to build the world's tallest building Raskob faced competition his fellow speculator, Walker Chrysler, who was building his own 1,146 foot high skyscraper. Meanwhile, William Crapo Durrant busied himself with new stock ppols. In March 1930, President HOover announced that "the worst effects of the crash upon employment will have passed during the next sixty days." The following month the Dow Jones broke through the 300 barrier, up nearly 50 percent from its post-Crash low.

Yet the "sucker's rally," as it was later called, came to an end in the spring of 1930 and the market resumed its downward course until the summer of 1932, when the Dow reached a low of 41.88 on a turnover of under 400,000 shares. In the intervening period, the country's gross national product had fallen by 60 percent from its 1929 level, and unemployment had risen to twelve and a half million. Over a third of the nonagricultural workforce was unemployed.

As the nation sank into depression, the apotheosis of the businessman came to an end (pages 217-219).

Some remarkable parallel's, huh? I'm not sure what will happen this time. I doubt it will be a 60 percent decline in GNP . . . but who knows? It's an uncertain time, and it seems to me as though it's time to go back to the basic, certain principles as much as possible (if you ever left them).

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